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Essay
International Tax as International Law
REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH*
I. INTRODUCTION
Is international tax law part of international law? To an interna-
tional lawyer, the question posed probably seems ridiculous. Of
course international tax law is part of international law, just like tax
treaties are treaties. But to an international tax lawyer, the question
probably seems less obvious, because most international tax lawyers
do not think of themselves primarily as international lawyers (public
or private), but rather as tax lawyers who happen to deal with cross-
border transactions. And indeed, once one delves into the details, it
becomes clear that in some ways international tax law is different
from "regular" international law. For example, international tax law-
yers talk about residence and source jurisdiction, not nationality and
territoriality, and the different names also carry different content.
And while tax treaties are indeed treaties, they are concluded differ-
ently than other treaties (for example, they are negotiated by Trea-
sury, not the State Department), are subject to different modes of
interpretation (the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT)1, the "bible" of the international lawyer, is rarely invoked),
and in the United States are subject to a rather peculiar mode of uni-
lateral change, the treaty override.
The purpose of this Essay is to introduce to the international lawyer
the somewhat different set of categories employed by international
tax lawyers, and explain the reasons for some of the differences. At
the same time, I hope to persuade practicing international tax lawyers
and international tax academics that their field is indeed part of inter-
national law, and that it would help them to think of it this way. For
example, I believe that knowledge of the VCLT would help interna-
tional tax lawyers in interpreting tax treaties and avoiding some com-
mon mistakes.
* Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law, University of Michigan. I would like to thank Eyal
Benvenisti, Yariv Brauner, Steve Ratner, Mathias Reimann, and Joel Samuels for their
helpful comments.
1 May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
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This Essay has five Sections. After this Introduction, Section II dis-
cusses international jurisdiction to tax and how it differs from tradi-
tional international law concepts of jurisdiction. The issues addressed
in this Section are familiar to international tax lawyers but may be
new and interesting for international lawyers. Section III discusses tax
treaties and how they differ from regular treaties in both interpreta-
tion and modification. Here, international tax lawyers can learn from
international lawyers, but also vice versa. Section IV discusses the dif-
ficult and much debated question whether there exists an interna-
tional customary tax law. In this context it is international tax lawyers
who have most to gain by listening to international lawyers. Section V
concludes by returning to the question posed above, answering in the
affirmative, and then summarizing the ways international tax lawyers
and international lawyers can learn from each other.
II. JURISDICTION TO TAx
The traditional grounds of jurisdiction to prescribe in international
law are nationality ("the activities, interests, status, or relations of [a
state's] nationals outside as well as within its territory") 2 and territori-
ality ("conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within [a
state's] territory"). 3 Territoriality is expanded to cover conduct
outside a state's territory that has, or is intended to have, a "substan-
tial effect" within its territory.4 As detailed below, international tax
law modifies both concepts to a significant extent, resulting primarily
in expanding the scope of nationality jurisdiction.
A. Individuals: Redefinition of Nationality Jurisdiction
as Residence
Nationality usually is understood as equivalent to citizenship. Ex-
cept for the United States, however, almost no other country in the
world claims the right to tax its citizens on foreign source income
when they live permanently in another country. The United States
insists on the right to tax its citizens on worldwide income no matter
where they live.5 The Supreme Court in Cook v. Tait upheld this prin-
ciple because of the benefits the United States provides its citizens
even if they live overseas. 6 But the opinion is weak, its underlying
rationale is doubtful (are these benefits really so great?), and almost
2 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 402(2) (1987).
3 Id. § 402(1)(a).
4 Id. § 402(1)(c).
5 IRC §§ 1, 2(d), 7701(a)(30).
6 265 U.S. 47 (1924).
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no other country follows the rule. Thus, although international law
seems to sanction the U.S. practice (and the United States has written
it into all its tax treaties), it seems a dubious rule to follow, and it has
been criticized by academics.
7
Instead, every country in the world (including the United States)
has adopted a definition of nationality for tax purposes that is much
broader than how nationality commonly is understood. That defini-
tion is residence, which usually implies mere physical presence in the
country for a minimum number of days. In the United States, physical
presence for 183 days in a given year generally is sufficient to subject
an individual to taxing jurisdiction on her worldwide income for that
year.8 Even fewer days suffice if added to days spent in the United
States in the previous two years.9 Other countries follow a similar
rule,10 although they sometimes supplement it with a "fiscal domicile"
test that looks to less bright line factors such as location of principal
abode, family ties, and the like. The two tests (physical presence and
fiscal domicile) also are incorporated into tax treaties.11
This definition is a remarkable expansion of the concept of nation-
ality. I doubt there is another substantive area of international law in
which nationality jurisdiction for individuals rests on so flimsy a
ground as mere physical presence. In fact, because of this expansive
view, it is easy to be subject to residence-based taxation by a country
in one year and not in the next, and it is also easy for individuals to
have dual tax residency. Elaborate rules are necessary to address situ-
ations in which individuals move in and out of resident status from
year to year (for example, rules on deemed sales of their property
when they leave' 2 ), and to avoid dual residence double taxation.
13
Why has nationality-based jurisdiction been so expanded in tax
law? The reason is easy to see if one considers the implications of the
relative ease of acquiring a tax haven nationality. If tax law followed
the general international law rule and imposed worldwide taxation
only on citizens, then a lot of U.S. citizens would abandon their citi-
zenship in exchange for that of some Caribbean tax haven jurisdiction,
7 See, e.g., Brainard L. Patton, Jr., United States Individual Income Tax Policy as It
Applies to Americans Resident Overseas: Or, If I'm Paying Taxes Equal to 72 Percent of
My Gross Income, I Must Be Living in Sweden, 1975 Duke L.J. 691; Note, Section 911 Tax
Reform, 54 Minn. L. Rev. 823 (1969-1970).
8 IRC § 7701(a)(30), (b).
9 IRC § 7701(b)(3).
10 E.g., William H. Newton, III, International Income Tax and Estate Planning § 5:40
(2d ed. 2004) (discussing similar rule of, among others, Austria, Denmark, France, and
Germany).
11 Id.
12 E.g., IRC § 877.
13 E.g., IRC § 7701(b)(2) (setting out rules for the first and last year of residence).
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and thereby avoid taxation on their foreign source income while living
permanently in the United States. In general, living in a country for
over one-half year is considered a sufficient ground for worldwide tax-
ation because of the presumed benefits derived from that country.
The residence rule is so widely followed and incorporated into so
many treaties that it can be considered part of customary international
law, even though it seems contrary to widely shared understandings of
nationality. 14 It is thus appropriate for the United States to follow this
rule. It is doubtful, however, whether the United States should con-
tinue to insist on taxing its citizens living overseas, especially since
because of a combination of exemptions and credits (and enforcement
difficulties) it collects little tax from them.15
B. Corporations: Expansion of Nationality Jurisdiction to CFCs
The nationality of a corporation is a thorny issue, which comes up in
other areas of the law as well. In general, corporations are considered
nationals based either on the country in which they are incorporated
(the U.S. approach), or the country from which they are managed and
controlled (the U.K. approach), or both.16 Each approach has its ad-
vantages and disadvantages; the U.S. approach is the easiest to admin-
ister but also the most manipulable, as shown recently by so-called
inversion transactions in which corporations shifted their nominal
country of incorporation to Bermuda while retaining all of their head-
quarters and management in the United States.1 7 The U.K. approach
is manipulated less easily but requires more administrative resources
to police.
The interesting aspect of nationality jurisdiction for corporations in
tax law is the gradual adoption of a rule that permits countries to tax
"controlled foreign corporations" (CFCs), that is, corporations con-
trolled by nationals, as if they were nationals themselves. This rule
originated with the United States. 8 Because the definition of corpo-
rate nationality in the United States is formal (country of incorpora-
tion), 19 it is easy for U.S. nationals (residents) who have foreign
source income to avoid taxation on such income by shifting it to a
corporation incorporated in another country, preferably a tax haven,
14 See Section IV.
15 See, e.g., IRC §§ 901, 911-912.
16 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 72-378, 1972 C.B. 662 (noting that countries can base corporate
residence on place of incorporation or on place of management and control); Finance Act,
1989, § 249 (Eng.).
17 See, e.g., Hal Hicks, III, Overview of Inversion Transactions: Selected Historical,
Contemporary, and Transactional Perspectives, 30 Tax Notes Int'l 899, 905 (June 2, 2003).
18 See text accompanying notes 21-23.
19 IRC § 7701(a)(4).
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where it can accumulate tax free. For example, Jacob Schick, the in-
ventor of the Schick disposable razor, transferred his patent to it to a
Bermuda corporation that accumulated the royalties. Schick later
proceeded to retire to Bermuda, gave up his U.S. citizenship, and
lived on the accumulated tax-free profits.
20
To address this problem, in 1937 the United States adopted a rule
that taxed shareholders of "foreign personal holding corporations"
(FPHCs).21 A FPHC was defined as a foreign corporation controlled
(over 50% by vote) by five or fewer U.S. resident individuals, and
whose income was over 60% passive (since passive income was con-
sidered easier to shift than active income).22 Interestingly, at the time,
the United States considered it a breach of international law to tax a
FPHC (a foreign national) directly on foreign source income;23 in-
stead, it adopted a rule that taxed the U.S. shareholders on a deemed
dividend of the accumulated passive income of the FPHC.24 This rule
can be compared to the personal holding company (PHC) regime
adopted at the same time, which applied to domestic corporations and
taxed them directly on their accumulated income at the shareholder
rate (PHCs were used by shareholders to shelter U.S. source income
from the higher individual rate by earning the income through a cor-
poration subject to tax at a lower rate).
25
Judge Frank of the Second Circuit upheld the deemed dividend rule
without paying any attention to its international law implications. 26
And yet, it clearly represented a major expansion of U.S. residence
taxing jurisdiction, since taxing a deemed dividend is economically
equivalent to taxing a foreign corporation directly on foreign source
income. It certainly could be argued that in 1943 this rule was a
breach of international law, just like Judge Hand's antitrust decision in
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,27 which invented the ef-
fects doctrine, was likewise arguably a breach of international law.
28
20 Tax Evasion and Avoidance: Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Tax Evasion and
Avoidance, 75th Cong. 63 (1937).
21 See Robert J. Peroni, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Stephen E. Shay, Getting Serious
About Curtailing Deferral of U.S. Tax on Foreign Source Income, 52 SMU L. Rev. 445,
475 (1999); H.R. Rep. No. 75-1546, at 13-14 (1937), excerpted in J.S. Seidman, Seidman's
Legislative History of Federal Income Tax Laws, 1938-1961, at 189 (1938).
22 See Peroni, et al., note 21, at 476.
23 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Deemed Dividend Problem, 4 J. Tax'n Global Trans-
actions 33, 34 (2004) [hereinafter Deemed Dividend Problem].
24 Revenue Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-377, §§ 331-341, 50 Stat. 813, 1731.
25 Revenue Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-377, §§ 351-360, 50 Stat. 813, 1732.
26 Eder v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 27, 28-29 (2d Cir. 1943).
27 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
28 See Roger P. Alford, The Extraterritorial Application of Anti-Trust Laws: The
United States and European Community Approaches, 33 Va. Int'l L. 1, 42 (1999).
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The impact of the deemed dividend rule was greatly expanded when
the Kennedy administration decided in 1961 to propose applying the
same rule to all income of corporations that are over 50% controlled
by large (10% by vote each) U.S. shareholders, that is, to subsidiaries
of U.S multinationals (CFCs). 29 Ultimately, this resulted in the enact-
ment in 1962 of subpart F, which applied the deemed dividend rule to
certain types of income (mostly passive income) of all CFCs.
30
Again, there was no international law challenge to the deemed divi-
dend rule. Instead, other countries began to copy the CFC regime:
Germany in 1972,31 Canada in 1976,32 Japan in 1978,33 France in
1980,3 4 and the UK35 in 1984. Currently, there are 23 countries with
CFC rules (mostly developed ones), 36 and the number is likely to in-
crease. Thus, it would seem that the CFC concept arguably has be-
come part of customary international law, just like the expansion of
territorial jurisdiction over international waters rapidly changed inter-
national law from the 1970's onward.
Even more striking is the fact that many of the countries adopting
the CFC rule abandoned the deemed dividend idea, which can lead to
significant difficulties in practice, in favor of direct taxation of the
CFC's shareholders on its earnings on a pass-through basis.37 Thus,
the jurisdictional rule has been changing and no longer seems to re-
quire a deemed dividend, and may even permit direct taxation of a
CFC on its foreign source income because it is controlled by residents.
Indeed, the Service itself has adopted this view, because it now be-
lieves that both the PHC regime, as well as the older accumulated
earnings tax regime, apply directly to foreign corporations even
though their effect is to tax the corporation on foreign source in-
come.38 This is particularly striking for PHCs, because it was so clear
in 1937 that the United States had no jurisdiction to tax foreign corpo-
rations on foreign source income that Congress did not bother to spec-
ify that a PHC could not be a foreign corporation (while at the same
time adopting the parallel FPHC regime explicitly for foreign corpora-
29 See Peroni et al., note 21, at 476.
30 Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960 (adding IRC §§ 951-964).
31 OECD, Controlled Foreign Company Legislation 22 (1996).
32 Id. at 23.
33 Id. at 23.
34 Id. at 24.
35 Id.
36 See Brian J. Arnold, General Report, Limits on the Use of Low-Tax Regimes by
Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, 86b Cahiers de Droit
Fiscal Int'l (2001).
37 Avi-Yonah, Deemed Dividend Problem, note 23, at 35-38.
38 Rev. Rul. 60-34, 1960-1 C.B. 203; see IRC § 542(c)(7); Reg. § 1.532-1(a).
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tions).39 Now this oversight enables the Service to argue that under
the new understanding of jurisdictional limits, the PHC rules as well
as the FPHC rules apply to foreign corporations.
Claiming that nationality jurisdiction applies to foreign corporations
just because they are controlled by nationals is a striking departure
from ordinary international law. Compare, for example, the oft-recur-
ring disputes about the extraterritorial application of international
sanctions. In both Fruehauf4° and Sensor41 , the foreign courts explic-
itly rejected U.S. claims to require foreign subsidiaries of U.S. mul-
tinationals to obey U.S. sanctions aimed at China and the USSR,
respectively. In Sensor, the Dutch court went through all the possible
grounds for jurisdiction and explicitly found that none applied.42 It
was clear that nationality jurisdiction did not apply even though the
subsidiary was controlled from the United States.
What, then, enables the United States and other countries to ex-
pand nationality jurisdiction to subsidiaries in the tax area? The ex-
planation is the "first bite at the apple rule," adopted by the League of
Nations in 1923. 43 Under that rule, the source (territorial) jurisdiction
has the primary right to tax income arising within it, and the residence
(nationality) jurisdiction is obligated to prevent double taxation by
granting an exemption or a credit. Thus, permitting the expansion of
residence jurisdiction to CFCs does not harm the right of source juris-
dictions to tax them first; residence (nationality) jurisdiction only ap-
plies as a residual matter when the source jurisdiction abstains from
taxing. This still leads sometimes to complaints by source jurisdictions
that the residence jurisdiction is taking away their right to effectively
grant tax holidays to foreign investors,44 but the restricted application
of CFC rules to passive income mitigates even that.
In general, I believe this story is a good illustration of the growth of
customary international law in the tax area. In the 1930's-1960's pe-
39 See Avi-Yonah, Deemed Dividend Problem, note 23. As a result, the FPHC regime
and the PHC regimes were duplicative, as well as redundant in light of the later PFIC
regime, and both were repealed (FPHC completely, PHC for foreign corporations) in the
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-35, § 413.
40 Fruehauf Corp. v. Massardy Cours D'Appel Paris, May 22, 1965, Gaz Pal 1965
(France), translated in 5 I.L.M. 476 (1966).
41 Compagne Europednne des Petroles, SA v. Sensor Nederland, BV, Distr Ct, The
Hague, Sept. 17, 1982, 36 Rechtspraak van de Week-Kort Geding 167, translated in 22
I.L.M. 66 (1983).
42 Id. at 70-74.
43 Report on Double Taxation, Submitted to the Financial Committee by Professors
Bruins, Einaudi, Seligman and Sir Josiah Stamp, League of Nations Doc. No. E.F.S.
73.F.19 (1923), reprinted in 4 Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n, Legislative History of United
States Tax Conventions 4003 (1962).
44 See, e.g., Antonio Figueroa, Tax Treaties and International Investment Flows, Taxa-
tion and International Capital Flows 93-97 (1990).
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riod, there was a clear rule of customary international law that prohib-
ited taxing foreign corporations on foreign source income. That rule
was observed universally and was considered binding, as illustrated by
the United States using the deemed dividend mechanism to avoid an
outright breach. Once, however, a lot of countries changed the rule
by taxing shareholders directly on CFC income, the United States no
longer considered it binding, as indicated by applying the PHC regime
to foreign corporations. 45 The next step for the United States would
be to abolish the obsolete deemed dividend rule and replace it by a
direct tax on the CFCs.
C. The Problem of Territorial Jurisdiction (Source)
The right of countries to tax income arising in their territory is well
established in international law. In fact, some countries (for example,
France) begin with the assumption that the only income they have the
right to tax is domestic source income, although France and other ter-
ritorial jurisdictions have long since begun to tax some income of na-
tionals from foreign sources.46 And even countries that begin with
worldwide taxation of nationals, like the United States and the UK, in
practice do not tax foreign source income as heavily.
The special problem of territoriality in the tax area is that the
source of income is very difficult to define. In fact, most public fi-
nance economists would deny that it is a meaningful concept in the
majority of cases. 47 Think of a law firm in country A that provides
advice on the legal implications of a merger of two multinationals
whose parents are in countries A and B and whose operations are in
20 countries around the globe. What is the economic source of the
law firm's income?
Ideally, one could imagine a world in which all countries tax only on
a nationality (residence) basis, and the only problem would be as-
signing residence to individuals (not too hard) and to corporations
(quite difficult). But in practice, as long as countries desire to tax non-
residents on domestic source income, as they have every right to do
under international law, the problem of defining source would persist.
To some extent the problem has been solved by arbitrary rules em-
bodied in tax treaties that define the source of various categories of
45 See Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-216, § 351, 48 Stat. 680, 751-52 (adding PHC
regime).
46 Hugh J. Ault & Brian J. Arnold, Comparative Income Taxation: A Structural Analy-
sis 379, 389 (2d ed. 2004).
47 Hugh J. Ault & David F. Bradford, Taxing International Income: An Analysis of the
U.S. System and Its Economic Premises, 14 Tax'n in the Global Economy 11, 31-32 (Assaf
Razin & Joel Slemrod eds., 1990).
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income (and that in my view may form part of customary international
law). For example, income from services is sourced where the services
are provided (and not where they are consumed); dividend and inter-
est income are sourced by the residence of the payor; capital gains are
sourced by the residence of the seller; and so on.48 The difficulty then
becomes deciding which category income falls into, which is some-
times very hard (consider for example how to distinguish between
sales, services, and royalty income when downloading software off the
internet, buying it in a store, or receiving it in a pre-installed package
on a PC).
In the case of multinationals, the sourcing issue becomes even
harder because taxing them requires allocating the income of a con-
trolled group of corporations among taxing jurisdictions. If tax au-
thorities merely followed the form (regarding which subsidiary
nominally earned the income from intergroup transactions), all in-
come of multinationals would be booked in tax haven subsidiaries. A
whole branch of tax law called transfer pricing is devoted to resolving
this problem. 49 In Section IV, I return to this point, because it pro-
vides a good illustration of customary international tax law.
The main point here is simply that territoriality, which is a relatively
easy concept to define in international law in general, becomes very
hard when tax law is concerned. And it may be a pity that interna-
tional law makes it so easy to tax foreigners on a territoriality basis,
although as long as one wants to tax corporations, I suspect that
source-based taxation is inevitable (since the residence of corpora-
tions is inherently more manipulable and less meaningful than the res-
idence of individuals).
III. TAX TREATIES
A. Treaty Interpretation and the VCLT
Tax treaties are, of course, treaties: They are considered by the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee (and not the Finance Commit-
tee) and ratified by the Senate just like any other treaty.50 But they
are also unlike other treaties. First, they are negotiated by the Inter-
national Tax Counsel in Treasury's Office of Tax Policy, not by the
State Department. Second, their interpretation is governed primarily
by the Technical Explanation, 51 which likewise is drafted by Treasury
48 See generally Joel D. Kuntz & Robert J. Peroni, U.S. International Taxation I A2.03
(2002).
49 See, e.g., IRC § 482.
50 U.S. Const. art. II, § II, cl. 2.
51 E.g., Treas. Dep't, Technical Explanation of the Canada-U.S. 1995 Protocol, 1 Tax
Treaties (CCH) 1951 (June 13, 1995).
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and not by State. And finally, the ways tax treaties are interpreted
differ markedly from the interpretation of other treaties.
The biggest difference relates to the role of the VCLT. David
Bederman writes that "[t]he VCLT is, quite literally, a treaty on trea-
ties. Almost every question of treaty law is settled in that document,
and it is an essential bit of reading for every international lawyer.
'52
But not for the international tax lawyer. A search of the tax cases
database in LEXIS revealed among hundreds of treaty interpretation
cases only one quite recent case in which a court discussed the poten-
tial application of the VCLT.
53
It is true, of course, that the United States signed but never ratified
the VCLT;54 but this does not prevent U.S. international lawyers from
relying on it in nontax contests as embodying customary international
law (in fact, having signed the VCLT, the United States is supposed
not to act contrary to it55). Rather, the lack of reference to the VCLT
in tax treaty cases simply results from the fact that most tax lawyers
have never heard of it. Instead, they rely for example on the OECD
commentary on the OECD model tax treaty,56 which frequently is
cited in treaty interpretation cases.5
7
This sometimes can lead to unfortunate, even bizarre, results. For
example, article 31 of the VCLT states a general rule that treaties
should be interpreted "in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in
light of its object and purpose."58 "Context" for this purpose includes
any subsequent protocols and contemporaneous instruments relating
to the treaty, and subsequent practice relating to implementation. 9
Article 32 of the VCLT states that as supplementary sources recourse
may be had to "preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances
of its conclusion . . . ," but only "to confirm the meaning resulting
from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when
interpretation according to article 31: (a) [leaves the meaning ambig-
uous or obscure; or (b) [1]eads to a result which is manifestly absurd or
unreasonable. "60
52 David J. Bederman, International Law Frameworks 26 (2001).
53 Kappus v. Commissioner, 337 F.3d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
54 Restatement, note 2, at 144-45.
55 VCLT, note 1, at 336.
56 OECD, Model Convention With Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, Jan. 28,
2003, available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/34/1914467.pdf; 1 OECD, Model Tax Con-
vention on Income and on Capital (2000).
57 See, e.g., Taisei Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 535, 548 (1995).
58 VCLT, note 1, at 340.
59 Id.
60 Id.
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Now consider the case of Xerox Corporation v. United States.61
That case involved a highly technical question on the interpretation of
the 1975 U.S.-U.K. tax treaty. The Court of Claims found support for
the Service's view in (1) the language of the treaty itself, (2) the con-
temporaneous technical explanation, (3) IRS practice as evidenced by
a revenue procedure, and (4) a subsequent agreement between the
competent authorities designed to settle the matter. 62 The Court of
Appeals chose to ignore all of those sources and relied instead on affi-
davits submitted to it by the treaty negotiators as to what they
meant.63 It is hard to imagine such a result under the VCLT, since all
the article 31 sources supported the Service, and the affidavits (at best
article 32, and therefore inferior, sources) were not even contempora-
neous with the treaty but executed years later when the affiants were
in private practice and had no stake in protecting the fisc. Not surpris-
ingly, it is hard to defend the result in Xerox from a pure tax perspec-
tive either; the general consensus is that the corporation "got away
with murder."
My point here is simply that it would be a good idea for interna-
tional tax lawyers to study the VCLT. A lot of hard thinking went
into that treaty, and it should not lightly be ignored.
B. Treaty Overrides
The most notorious difference between tax treaties and other U.S.
treaties is the frequency of treaty overrides (other treaties are overrid-
den, but much less frequently). Under international law, pacta sunt
servanda; "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties and must
be performed by them in good faith... A party may not invoke the
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a
treaty. " 64
Under U.S. law, however, treaties are, under the Supremacy Clause
of the Constitution, equal in standing to regular laws.65 Therefore, at
least as interpreted by the Supreme Court, the general rule of later in
time controls.66 In the tax context, § 7852(d) embodies this rule, and
states that "[f]or purposes of determining the relationship between a
provision of a treaty and any law of the United States affecting reve-
61 41 F.3d 647 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
62 Xerox Corp. v. United States, 14 C1. Ct. 455, 462-66 (1988).
63 Xerox, 41 F.3d at 654.
64 VCLT, note 1, at 339.
65 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
66 Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194-95 (1888); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371,
376 (1998).
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nue, neither the treaty nor the law shall have preferential status by
reason of its being a treaty or law."
Of course, this unique U.S. interpretation applies to all U.S. trea-
ties, not just to tax treaties. But at least in recent years, its clearest
manifestation has been in the tax area. The reason that tax is particu-
larly sensitive in this context is first, that tax law changes all the time
while treaties are slow to renegotiate, and second, that the U.S. House
of Representatives has a special role to play in the tax area (all reve-
nue measures must originate with it67), but is excluded from involve-
ment with treaties, and therefore insists on its right to change tax
treaties through legislation even though this clearly violates customary
international law as embodied in the VCLT.
But the interesting question is, when does the United States resort
to treaty overrides? The answer is rarely, and when it does so deliber-
ately, an argument can be made that it is justified in doing so. Con-
sider three recent cases from the period 1986-1997: the branch profits
tax, the earnings stripping rule, and the reverse hybrid rule.
68
The branch profits tax (BPT) was enacted in 198669 to equalize the
positions of foreign investors who operate in the United States
through a subsidiary and through a branch. 70 Before 1986, investors
who operated through a subsidiary were subject to tax on the subsidi-
ary's income and also to a withholding tax on dividends, whereas in-
vestors who operated through a branch were subject only to a tax on
the branch income because distributions from the branch were not
dividends and were not subject to withholding tax.71 Under the new
rule, the earnings and profits attributable to a U.S. branch of a foreign
corporation were subject to the BPT.72 But a problem arose: Many
U.S. tax treaties prohibited taxing distributions to foreign sharehold-
ers from foreign corporations resident in a treaty country even if the
distribution came out of the earnings of a U.S. branch.73 Arguably the
BPT violated the spirit of this rule (although not its letter). So did the
United States resort to treaty override? It did not. Instead, it an-
nounced that the BPT would not apply to residents of those treaty
countries until the treaties were renegotiated to permit the BPT.74 In
67 U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
68 IRC §§ 884, 163(j), 894(c).
69 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1241, 100 Stat. 2085, 2576-81.
70 See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-841, at 11-647, reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. (vol. 4) 647.
71 See Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 100th Cong., General Explanation of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, at 1035-45 (Comm. Print 1987).
72 See IRC § 884(c).
73 See S. Rep. No. 99-313, at 11-402, reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. (vol. 3) 402.
74 See id. at 11-404-11-405.
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fact, by now most U.S. treaties have been so renegotiated,75 and other
countries have adopted a branch profits tax in their own laws. 76
But this left the United States in a difficult position, because while
treaties were slowly renegotiated, it could collect the BPT on some
branches but not on others. At the time, there were no limitation-on-
benefits provisions in U.S. treaties, leading to a concern that there
would be widespread treaty shopping (by, for example, setting up a
corporation in a treaty jurisdiction just to benefit from the treaty). So
the United States inserted a limitation-on-benefits provision into the
BPT rule in the Code and made that an explicit treaty override. 77 Was
it justified? I believe that an underlying assumption of treaties is that
they are intended to benefit only bona fide residents (otherwise, any
treaty becomes a "treaty with the world"). Thus, I think the override
was justified because it is consistent with the underlying purpose of
the treaties. But countries like the Netherlands that later negotiated
much longer limitation-on-benefits provisions78 that were full of loop-
holes may have had reason to be miffed, because they derive revenue
by letting their treaties be used for treaty shopping.
Next, consider the earnings stripping rule, adopted in 1989.79 That
rule is a "thin capitalization" provision; thus, it is intended to prevent
foreign parents from eliminating the tax base of their U.S. subsidiaries
(or branches) through interest deductions by capitalizing them mostly
with debt rather than equity.80 When Congress adopted the rule, it
was concerned that the rule would appear to be a violation of the
nondiscrimination provision in tax treaties if it applied only to foreign
related parties.81 Thus, to avoid even the appearance of a treaty over-
ride, the United States instead applied the rule to all "tax exempt re-
lated parties"-that is, to domestic tax-exempts as well as foreigners.82
But this was an obvious ruse, since no domestic tax-exempts are ever
related (that is, control over 50%) to domestic taxable subsidiaries.
Nor do I believe the ruse was necessary, because most countries have
a thin capitalization rule and apply it explicitly to foreigners. 83 I thus
75 See, e.g., Income Tax Convention, Dec. 18, 1992, U.S.-Neth., art. 11, 3 Tax Treaties
6103.12 (branch profits tax).
76 See Ault & Arnold, note 46, at 410-11 (Canada, France, and Australia).
77 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1241, 100 Stat. 2085, 2578; IRC
§ 884(e)(1)(B) (restricting treaty benefits to foreign corporations that are "qualified re-
sidents" of the treaty partner within the meaning of IRC § 884(e)(4)).
78 See U.S.-Neth. Treaty, note 75, art. 26, 3 Tax Treaties (CCH) 6103.28.
79 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7210, 103 Stat.
2106, 2339-42 [hereinafter OBRA] (adopting IRC § 163(j)).
80 See generally H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-386, at 564-71, reprinted in 1989-3 C.B. (vol. 5)
564-71.
81 See id. at 568-69.
82 OBRA, note 79, § 7210, 103 Stat. at 2340.
83 Ault & Arnold, note 46, at 412-14 (Canada, Australia, U.K., Japan, and Germany).
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believe thin capitalization is an accepted customary international law
exception to nondiscrimination, which is necessary because the source
country has the primary right to tax active business income and with-
out a thin capitalization rule that base easily can disappear. What is
striking, though, is how reluctant the United States was to override
treaties.
Finally, consider the reverse hybrid rule, adopted by the United
States as a treaty override in 1997.84 The rule was adopted in response
to a transaction in which a Canadian parent set up a limited liability
company in the United States and capitalized it with what was equity
for Canadian purposes but debt for U.S. purposes. 85 The United
States treated the LLC as a branch but Canada treated it as a subsidi-
ary. The result was that, from a U.S. perspective, the tax on the
branch was offset by interest deductions on the debt with a reduced
rate of withholding tax under the treaty, but from a Canadian perspec-
tive, the income was treated as exempt dividends from a controlled
subsidiary: hence double nontaxation. The United States could have
(and indeed later did) renegotiate the treaty, but this takes time, and a
lot of revenue was being lost. Hence the treaty override, to which
Canada did not object, denied treaty benefits to such a "reverse hy-
brid." Fundamentally, I believe the override was justified because the
purpose of tax treaties is to prevent double taxation and not to enable
double nontaxation; reductions of tax at source should be premised on
taxation by the residence jurisdiction.
In each of these cases I think an override was justified. The reality
is that tax law and practice change too fast to wait for treaties to be
renegotiated. Still, overrides should be used sparingly and only when
consistent with the underlying purpose of the treaty. And there are
unjustified overrides, such as the provision of the alternative mini-
mum tax that limits the foreign tax credit to 90%.86 That leads di-
rectly to double taxation and is not justifiable in the treaty context,
but courts (including recently the D.C. Circuit8 7) have accepted it as a
valid override (even though Congress did not explicitly designate it as
such).
IV. Is THERE A CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL TAx LAW?
Customary international law is law that "results from a general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
84 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1054(a), 111 Stat. 788, 943-44
(adopting IRC § 894(c)).
85 See H.R. Rep. No. 105-148, at 550-51, reprinted in 1997-4 C.B. (vol. 1) 872-73.
86 See IRC § 59(a)(2).
87 See, e.g., Kappus v. Commissioner, 337 F.3d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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obligation. ' 88 "International agreements create law for states parties
thereto and may lead to the creation of customary international law
when such agreements are intended for adherence by states generally
and are in fact widely accepted.
89
There clearly are international tax practices that are widely fol-
lowed, such as avoiding double taxation by granting an exemption for
foreign source income or a credit for foreign taxes. Moreover, there
are over 2,000 bilateral tax treaties in existence, 90 and they all follow
one of two widely accepted models (the OECD and UN model trea-
ties),91 which themselves are quite similar to each other and are "in-
tended for adherence by states generally. ' 92 Is this enough to create a
customary international tax law?
International tax lawyers hotly debate this question, although usu-
ally it is not couched in these terms. Instead, the debate is about
whether countries are bound by an "international tax regime" or "in-
ternational tax system," or whether international tax is only about the
law adopted by each country and the treaties to which it binds itself.
93
Specifically, the debate is about international tax arbitrage, for exam-
ple, transactions that utilize differences between tax laws to achieve
double nontaxation. On the one side are those who argue that there is
nothing wrong with tax arbitrage since there is no international tax
regime and each country is free to do as it likes, so taxpayers are also
free to exploit differences. 94 On the other hand are those who argue
that countries are not so free and that a coherent international tax
regime does exist.95 The debate is in part about specific provisions in
U.S. law that are designed to prevent double nontaxation, such as the
dual consolidated loss rules (which prevent taxpayers from claiming
the same loss to offset income in two taxing jurisdictions). 96 If there is
no international tax regime, such rules make no sense. Similarly, rules
such as those promulgated by Treasury in 1998, which prevent taxpay-
88 Restatement, note 2, § 102(2).
89 Id. § 102(3).
90 Victor Thuyroni, In Defense of a Multilateral Tax Treaty, 22 Tax Notes Int'l 1291,
1291 n.3 (Mar. 12, 2001).
91 OECD Model Treaty, note 56; UN, Model Double Taxation Convention Between
Developed and Developing Countries, 1980, 1 Tax Treaties (CCH) 1 206.
92 Restatement, note 2, § 102(2).
93 See, e.g., H. David Rosenbloom, International Tax Arbitrage and the "International
Tax System," The David R. Tillinghast Lecture, NYU School of Law (Oct. 1, 1998), in 53
Tax L. Rev. 137, 163-64 (2000); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Comment, 53 Tax L. Rev. 167, 169
(2000) [hereinafter Comment]; Yariv Brauner, An International Tax Regime in Crystalliza-
tion, 56 Tax L. Rev. 259, 308 (2003).
94 See, e.g., Rosenbloom, note 93.
95 See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, Comment, note 93.
96 See IRC § 1503(d).
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ers from usirg tax arbitrage to reduce foreign taxes are very
controversial.
97
In the following, I briefly survey some examples that in my opinion
strengthen the view that an international tax regime does exist and
that it rises to the level of customary international law. As usual, the
hard question is whether countries not only follow a rule but do so out
of a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris).
A. Jurisdiction to Tax
Can a country simply decide to tax nonresidents that have no con-
nection to it on foreign source income? The answer is clearly no, both
from a practical perspective and, I would argue, from a customary in-
ternational law perspective. The behavior of the United States in
adopting the FPHC and CFC rules9" illustrates that this rule is fol-
lowed from a sense of legal obligation. The United States adopted the
deemed dividend rule precisely because it felt bound by a customary
international law rule not to tax nonresidents directly on foreign
source income, even though they are controlled by residents.99 The
United States no longer feels bound by this rule, but that is because
enough other countries have adopted CFC legislation that expands
the definition of nationality that customary international law has
changed. 100 The spread of CFC legislation is a good example of how
rapidly customary international law, in fact, can change.
B. Nondiscrimination
The nondiscrimination norm (that is, that nonresidents from a
treaty country should not be treated worse than residents) is embod-
ied in all tax treaties. 101 But is it part of customary international law?
The behavior of the United States in the earnings stripping episode
suggests that at the time the United States felt that the nondiscrimina-
tion norm was binding even outside the treaty context. Otherwise,
even if it did not wish to override treaties, it could have applied a
different rule to nontreaty country residents (as it did in the branch
profits tax context three years earlier). Thus, I would argue that the
97 Rev. Rul. 98-11, 1998-1 C.B. 645; Rev. Rul. 98-35, 1998-2 C.B. 89.
98 See text accompanying notes 21-30.
99 President's Tax Message Along With Principal Statement, Detailed Explanation, and
Supporting Exhibits and Documents: Hearing on H.R. 1447 Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 87th Cong. 52 (1961) (statement of Douglas Dillon, Treas. Sec'y).
100 Ault & Arnold, note 46, at 380-86 (Canada, Japan, Sweden, U.K., Germany, and
Australia).
101 OECD Model Treaty, note 56, at 24.
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nondiscrimination norm in fact may be part of customary interna-
tional law even in the absence of a treaty.
C. The Arm's Length Standard
The standard applied in all tax treaties to the transfer pricing prob-
lem of determining the proper allocation of profits between related
entities is the "arm's length standard,"'01 2 which means that the tax
authorities may adjust transactions between related parties to the
terms that would have been negotiated had the parties been unre-
lated. This standard has been the governing rule since the 1930's.103
In the 1980's, the United States realized that in many circumstances
it is very difficult to find comparable transactions between unrelated
parties on which to base the arm's length determination. 10 4 It there-
fore began the process of revising the regulations that govern transfer
pricing.10 5 This culminated in 1995 with the adoption of two new
methods, the comparable profit method and profit split method, that
rely much less on finding comparables (and in the case of the profit
split method sometimes require no comparables at all).
10 6
What is remarkable about the process by which these regulations
were adopted is the U.S. insistence throughout that what Treasury was
doing was consistent with the arm's length standard. It even initially
called the profit split method the "basic arm's length return
method.' 0 7 But as I have pointed out elsewhere, once you abandon
the search for comparables, it is meaningless to call a method arm's
length, because without comparables nobody can know what unre-
lated parties would have done.
08
Nevertheless, despite initial objections, 10 9 the OECD ultimately
came to accept the gist of the new methods in its revised transfer pric-
ing guidelines, which were issued a short time after the new U.S. regu-
lations and represent the widely-followed consensus view of transfer
pricing.' 10 The new methods thus are accepted under the rubric of
arm's length.
102 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of Arm's Length: A Study in the Evolution
of U.S. International Taxation, 15 Va. Tax Rev. 89, 89 (1995) [hereinafter Rise and Fall];
Notice 88-123, 1988-2 C.B. 458, 475.
103 Avi-Yonah, Rise and Fall, note 102, at 97.
104 Id. at 112-29.
105 Id. at 129-36.
106 Reg. §§ 1.482-5 (comparable profit method), -6 (profit split method).
107 Notice 88-123, 1988-2 C.B. 458, 489.
08 Avi-Yonah, Rise and Fall, note 102, at 134-35.
109 See, e.g., Kathleen Matthews, Major U.S. Trading Partners Respond to U.S. Transfer
Pricing Regulations, 94 TNI 205-3 (Oct. 24, 1994), available in LEXIS, Tax Analysts File.
110 See OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Ad-
ministrations (1995).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
20041
TAX LAW REVIEW
As Brian Lepard has suggested, the insistence by the United States
that it was following the arm's length standard indicates that it felt
that the standard is part of customary international law.111 Such a
finding has important implications because the U.S. states explicitly
follow a non-arm's length method, formulary apportionment, which
the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld twice. 112 If the arm's length
method is customary international law, these cases may have been
wrongly decided, as customary international law is part of federal law
and arguably preempts contrary state law. 113
D. Foreign Tax Credits vs. Deductions
Many economists argue that countries should give only a deduction
for foreign taxes rather than a credit.114 Countries, however, gener-
ally grant either an exemption for foreign source income or a credit
for foreign taxes paid.115 Remarkably, in most cases (following the
lead of the United States) this is done even in the absence of a
treaty.' 16 It is likely that at this point countries consider themselves in
practice bound by the credit or exemption norm, and a country would
feel highly reluctant to switch to a deduction method instead. Thus,
arguably preventing double taxation through a credit or exemption
has become part of customary international law.
E. Conclusion
If customary international tax law exists, this has important implica-
tions for the United States and other countries. As Justice Gray wrote
over a century ago in the Paquete Habana case,
[I]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascer-
tained and administered by the courts of justice of appropri-
ate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending
upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this
purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling execu-
111 Brian D. Lepard, Is the United States Obligated to Drive on the Right? A Multidis-
ciplinary Inquiry Into the Normative Authority of Contemporary International Law Using
the Arm's Length Standard as a Case Study, 10 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 43, 57-58 (1999).
112 Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298 (1994); Container
Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
113 Restatement, note 2, § 111(1).
114 See, e.g., Eric W. Bond & Larry Samuelson, Strategic Behaviour and the Rules for
International Taxation of Capital, 99 Econ. J. 1099 (1989).
115 See Michael J. Graetz & Paul W. Oosterhuis, Structuring an Exemption System for
Foreign Income of U.S. Corporations, 54 Nat'l Tax J. 771, 771 (2001).
116 E.g., IRC § 901.
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tive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had
to the customs and usages of civilized nations .... 117
To the extent legislation exists, in the United States it can override
customary international law as well as treaties. 118 But in the absence
of treaties or legislation, resort can be had to customary international
law; and I would argue that it also can be used to ascertain the under-
lying purposes of treaties.
To the extent that customary international tax law exists, this sug-
gests that it is a mistake to deny the existence of an international tax
system or regime. Admittedly, even if an international tax regime ex-
ists, we do not know what we should do about it; this has to be investi-
gated in each particular case. But we should not pretend that there
are no binding, widely-accepted international tax norms that we
should flout only when significant national interests are at stake.
V. CONCLUSION
Clearly, international tax law is part of international law, even if it
differs in some of its details from generally applicable international
law. I believe both international lawyers and international tax lawyers
can benefit from viewing international tax law in this way. For inter-
national lawyers, the tax field is an interesting arena to test some of
their ideas. It offers them a different view of nationality and territori-
ality jurisdiction, which perhaps can be profitably carried over into
other fields (I believe it would help, for example, to take control gen-
erally into account in determining the nationality of corporations). It
also offers interesting examples of how customary international law
can change rapidly, as in the CFC case.' 19 Finally, it suggests that
even a basic rule like pacta sunt servanda sometimes may have its
exceptions if one wishes to preserve the rationale of the underlying
treaty.
I believe, however, that it is international tax lawyers who can bene-
fit the most from viewing their field as part of international law. For
example, knowing the VCLT can prevent mistakes such as those com-
mitted in Xerox.120 And understanding that international tax law can
be seen in significant part as customary international law can help
clarify some of the constraints facing a country like the United States
as it struggles to adapt its international tax laws to the business reali-
ties of the 21st century.
117 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
118 Restatement, note 2, § 115(1)(a).
119 See Section II.B.
120 See note 62 and accompanying text.
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